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I. Introduction
On September 15, 16, and 17, 1960 the MIT Center for International
Studies conducted its second Political Exercise, once again at Endicott
House in Dedham, Mass. The general purpose was to carry a step further
the simulation of a crisis-type political situation as part of a continuing
experiment in gaming characterized by brevity, economy, and the high
professional quality of the participants. This second exercise was
planned with the cooperation of the Harvard Center for International
Affairs.*
The Center's first experimental political exercise in 1958 was
designed to test the potentialities and limitations of the gaming
technique. Our interest then was almost purely methodological, i.e.,
in the potential uses of gaming both as an educational too and as
a device for testing hypotheses developed in the course of more traditional
studies about international relations and in conventional policy planning.
The pioneer work on the latter by the Social Science Division of RAND was,
it hardly needs saying, invaluable to us.
In Polex II -- the 1960 game -- we wished to go a step further
and see if we could learn more about the value of the game technique
as a source of insights into possible alternatives, both political and
military, which might be available to American foreign policy in the
event of a serious diplomatic crisis involving American-Soviet relations.
*For details on previous experiments at MIT, see Bloomfield,
Lincoln P., Report and Analysis of Political Exercise, September 1958,
(C/58 - 21 Revised ditto) Center for International Studies; Bloomfield,
Lincoln P. and Padelford, Norman J., "Three Experiments in Political
Gaming", American Political Science Review, December 1959; and Bloomfield,
Lincoln P., "Political Gaming", US Naval Institute Proceedings, September
1960.
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2We particularly wished to learn more about the gaming of a simulated
crisis with the Soviet team playing a "realistic" strategy, faithfully
representing the known probabilities of Kremlin behavior, but with
the US side playing a "deviant" or "optimal" strategy. At the same
time we hoped to learn more about gaming with a minimum number of
teams rather than the ten at our first effort, and with somewhat more
formalized rules for moves, while still attempting to evoke the
real-life pressures which bear on governments in the real world.
The particular situation we sought to simulate in Polex II
centered on a revolt against the pro-Western ruling regime in an
underdeveloped country. The primary objectives of the revolutionary
group, as we hypothesized the situation, were to put an end to
corruption, inefficiency, and the foreign interference associated with
the ruling regime. The revolt began with some popular support and
considerable military support but no important initial Communist
influence as such. When the problem was placed before the two teams
which took part in the game - the Soviet Union and the United States -
fighting had already broken out between loyalist and rebel factions,
and the country was beginning to divide itself into fairly well"
defined areas controlled by each.
The problem as presented to the players also reported to them that
prior to the overt stage of the revolt the putative rebel leader had
approached the American ambassador in an attempt to insure US support
but that such support was not forthcoming at that stage. When the
revolt broke out, the teams were told, the Soviet Union had immediately
supported the rebel forces, while the government leader not unexpectedly
had declared the revolution to be a Soviet conspiracy and had called
publicly for assistance from the United States.
Once the problem was placed in their hands, the two teams appraised
3the situation in the form of written strategic estimates, stated their
policy objectives, and sketched out the contingencies they foresaw.
As the teams made their moves and the dynamic process of interaction
began, the strategies of the teams unfolded, not always in predictable
directions.
In the next section, entitled "Technique and Method", the
procedures which were followed are described in some detail. The
third part, entitled "Evaluation", draws some conclusions about
technique which might be of value in planning future political
exercises.
II. Technique and Method
1. Approach and Format
The exercise was conducted with only two teams - US and Soviet -
and a Control Group. The latter, under the co-chairmanship of the
two umpires, acted as collective referee and supplied the facts, factors,
actions, and reactions required to enable the two country teams to
go from move to move. The two playing teams did not seek to simulate
in detail every political, economic, propaganda, or military move
which the United States or Soviet Union might be expected to initiate
during the postulated crisis situation. Rather, the emphasis was on
fundamental choices and decisions based on those choices. Within
this frame of reference, designed to maximize the analytical possibility
of the game, it was possible to eliminate several elements which for
the sake of reality had been incorporated in the Center's earlier
political exercise. Five basically new elements were involved in
Polex II.
The first was the addition of military advisers, commented on later.
Secondly, the pelay was not continuous. The three-and-one-half day
4total play was divided into specific periods alternating between team
moves and Control Group (i.e., umpire) activity. This factor facilitated
analysis but to sbme extent detracted from realism. Another non-realistic
factor was the limiting of the exercise to essentially three teams.
A fourth change was that minor and secondary moves were eliminated
so far as possible: the emphasis was on strategy rather than on tactics.
Finally, there was no direct contact between the two playing teams.
These ground rules translated themselves into operational terms in
the game in the following ways: The Red (Soviet) and Blue (US) teams
were not expected to simulate in detail the running of governments.
The Blue team was instructed to consider itself, in the planning phase
of the game, as analogous to a National Security Planning Board which
had been transported to a distant underground emergency location to
follow the crisis in its broad contours and recommend to the NSC and
President, in their location, the basic moves which the US Government
should make. As expected, their deliberations resulted in some rather
fundamental recommendations which were put into action on a periodic
basis, i.e., when communications made it possible. Subsequently, as
it turned out, the President of the United States was able to take
firm command of all his facilities and resources.
The exercise was conducted in a series of discontinuous move
periods. Both teams and the Control Group had four periods of moves,
each of roughly one third of a day. In each of those move periods the
two teams went through a process of defining and, when necessary,
redefining their basic strategies; analysing the motives involved in
the other side's moves and the events necessary to foresee the courses
of action which might subsequently be open; developing the main
alternatives available to them; and determining their moves in relation
to those alternatives. Without any direct contact between them, the
teams reported their moves to the control team at the end of each
period. There were of course exceptions to the latter. If after
one hour of deliberations, for example, either side decided on
5a move - the commitment of military forces, for example - which would
alter the entire nature of the exercise and affect the whole environment,
this piece of information would be cranked in immediately. But if
it were simply decided to deploy certain forces and to make their actual
use contingent upon a series of other events, such a move would be
reported at the end of the move period along with everything else.
If the other side had not anticipated the contingency in question, the
umpires drew this to their attention and suggested that they return
to the drawing board to do so. The moves thus proceeded in a fairly
orderly sequence. In essence, during its move period each team formulated
its basic strategy and at the close of the move period made it available
to the umpires except in the extraordinary circumstances mentioned
above. The control team, out of those moves and its own knowledge
of the situation, plus its own invention of additional external factors,
created a new situation which was then made known to the teams. Thus,
decision point 2, so to speak, was a product of decision point 1 plus
action of the control team, and so on.
The instructions to the two teams made it clear that while the
Soviet strategy was expected to be "realistic", that is, as representative
as possible of the probable reactions of present Soviet leadership
to a given set of events, the American team's strategy was not to
be constrained or inhibited by predictable reactions on the part of
the administration in office in the United States on September 1960;
but neither was it to attempt to predict the strategy that would be
followed by either presidential candidate if he were elected. As it
turned out, the new "President" had a style and approach which were
satisfactorily distinctive.
62. Preparations
As with Pol-ex I, the second Endicott House Exercise was designed
with a minimum of staff time. The Game Director devoted a total of
perhaps three weeks to planning and coordinating the preparations. He
was assisted by a graduate student with firsthand experience in the
region in question, who worked for five weeks on the following: a
background paper on the country involved, fact sheets on treaties and
other agreements involving the area, governmental lineups, order of
battle of local army forces, and a ten-page scenario entitled, "'The
World Situation, September 14, 1961" which imaginatively described
the environment throughout the world at game time. For approximately
a month, the Game Director also had the assistance of an experienced
specialist, just returned from the area, who designed in appropriate
detail the problem with which the participants were to be confronted.
In addition there was available for the players a brief guide to the
functions and procedures of the UN.
The week before the exercise the participants were sent all the
papers referred to except the problem itself, and in addition a document
entitled "Operational Plan" in which the Game Director described the
formal structure and ground rules of the exercise. When the participants
convened at Endicott House on the morning of Wednesday, September 14,
1960, they were given a verbal briefing by the Game Director and were
then handed the problem. Unlike Polex I, no attempt was made here
to conceal in advance the general nature of the problem. If the players
had not been busy professionals, they would have been asked to prepare
strategic plans in advance. Since that was not possible, a virtue
was made out of necessity by withholding until the game actually
began the detailed nature of the crisis, the better to simulate its
probable real life impact.
73. Teams
The two playing.teams consisted of seven persons each. The internal
roles within the teams were designated in advance for only three of
these: the chairman, the military adviser, and the rapporteur. The
active team participants were predominantly men with distinguished
reputations in diplomacy or scholarship or both. An effort was made
to include on each team at least one man familiar with the area being
gamed and another whose professional specialty was defense policy.
The American team did not divide itself intoftactional specialties.
The Soviet team, however, did to a certain extent.
4. Control Group
The Control Group consisted of two umpires and five consultants,
with the Game Director more or less ex officio and periodically acting
as substitute or third umpire. The Control Group had the basic function
of reviewing the teams' moves for plausibility, assessing their strategies,
and redefining for the teams the new situation at the beginning of
each phase of the exercise. In the course of this process the Control
Group also supplied the moves, both initiatory and reactive, which
would plausibly come from other parts of the world, as well as intelligence
reports which should be available to the two playing teams. The
umpires, along with their consultants, could be consulted informally
by the teams at any time. The umpires for most of the game designated
members of the Control Group to be unobtrusively present in the two
team headquarters to get a picture of the situation which they reported
periodically to the umpires to assist the latter in their anticipatory
planning. As it turned out, the umpires played their role quite per-
missively. There was, however, one turning point late in the game which
they deliberately fabricated in order that the game might remain focused
on its primary study objectives bearing on the use - or withholding -
of military forces in the course of a steadily intensifying diplomatic
crisis situation. To counter the tendency of both teams to avoid such
8a strategic confrontation, the umpires accelerated time over the second
night and faced both sides with a quite unacceptable erosion of their
positions unless they at least seriously considered the introduction of
military forces of their own.
The consultants included two specialists on the area concerned,
one specialist in Soviet and China affairs, one generalist who supplied
reactions from some other areas and who% with the Game Director, stipulated
outcomes in the event of UN action, and one military adviser. In
addition the staff included two graduate students who assisted the
Control Group with communications drafting, reproduction, etc., the
administrative officer, and three secretaries one of whom was assigned
to each of the three groups.
5. Military Advice
One of the problems which havetroubled designers of both war
games and political games has been the difficulty of combining
satisfactorily in any one exercise significant political and military
factors without either overstressing or neglecting one or the other.
Manpower and planning have tended to be focussed either on a diplomatic
crisis situation - the typical game played in the universities in
recent years - or on a military hostilities situation - the game
emphasized by military researchers and the armed services. The
politically-oriented analysts have wished for some manageable way
to deal with the outbreak of hostilities without terminating the game
entirely. Some of the service schools have felt that the scenarios
with which their limited war games started were politically inadequate
and, moreover, that purely military exercises were insufficient to
train senior officers in the sophistication of modern crisis diplomacy,
with its richness of non-military as well as military factors.
9A method tried in Polex II may have advanced this problem a step
closer to resolution. The innovation was a simple one. The military
adviser on each team had the function of representing the kind of
military advice each side would be likely to get in the given situation.
But in addition, he and his two colleagues were specifically selected
and briefed with the notion that if the game ran into a hostilities
situation, they would be prepared to sit down together and make a
reasonably quick estimate of the military situation on D plus 1, D
plus 3, etc., without having to have complete G-2. detailed order
of battle, and so forth. In this way, if the logic of the simulated
situation led either or both sides to commit military forces, the
processes of political decision and diplomacy could take account of
military developments and go on, just as they would in a comparable
real life situation. In such a case, the problem would be brought
back to the players with the new situation redefined in military terms
which would enable them to proceed to new political decisions. The
experiment was a decided success.
6. Schedule
The schedule for the three-and-one-half day period worked out
approximately as planned: Nine o'clock on the morning of day one
(Wednesday, September 14) the entire group met together for a general
briefing and orientation session. At this session the exact nature
of the problem was disclosed. Each of the two teams then retired to
its headquarters on the second floor, and the control team was
organized in a single large conference room by the umpires. For the
remainder of the morning, through the lunch period, and until mid-
afternoon the Red and Blue teams studied the problem and developed their
basic strategic goals and relevant policies. They reported their initial
moves by 3 PM. This was Move Period No. 1. The following move periods
are summarized in tabular form.
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Umpire Period No. 1 The Control team worked through the rest of the
afternoon and into the dinner period, with a brief evening session for
all after dinner.
Move. Period No. 2 On day two from 9 AM until lunch time.
Umpire Period No. 2 From lunch until 3 PM.
Move Period No. 3 From 3 until 5:30 PM.
Umpire Period*No. 3 Dinner session, but no evening session.
Move Period No. 4 From 9 AM through lunch time on day three.
Umpire Period No. 4 Afternoon of day three.
During the latter session the Control Group made its plans for
the post-mortem critique period on Saturday morning. There was no
dinner or evening session on day three. The critique session ran from
9:30 to 1 PM on the fourth morning.
7. Time
The time period during which the hypothetical events began to
unfold was the late summer of 1961. The precise game time at which
the Soviet and American teams were confronted with the problem and
charged to act upon it was September 14, 1961 -- exactly one year
later than the real time at which the game commenced. According to the
scenario, world political relations remained fundamentally unchanged
between September 1960 and September 1961, and military technology,
while undergoing change, had not significantly altered the relative
positions of the two powers,
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8. Communications
All communications were channelled through the umpires. All moves
were in writing and took the form of brief typewritten statements,
communiques, diplomatic messages, intelligence reports, etc. All
communications for each team were numbered consecutively. Those
originating from the Red team were on red paper, Blue on blue, and
Control moves on white. "Game Classified" stamps were available to
use on communications where appropriate, although this was not to
inhibit the umpires from exercising their prerogative to "leak"
information when it was plausible to do so.
III. Evaluation
1. General Technique
Following the game, a questionnaire was mailed out to the participants,
seeking their reactions to the game. Reactions were uniformly very
favorable both to the individual experiences of the participants and,
more importantly, to the value and utility of the technique employed
in terms of political and military research and planning. Several
participants reported that, although originally skeptical of the value
of political gaming, they were now convinced. Others cited policy
preconceptions held prior to the game which the game experience had
altered. Several saw the game's chief value as a "thought provoker",
stimulating creative new lines of research or action. A number urged
that this technique be repeated fairly regularly in order to explore
a series of comparable problems facing American foreign policy.
The outstanding technical features of Polex II, in contrast to
Polex I were considerably greater formalization of team and umpire
moves and the introduction of a professional military capability into
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the teams and the Control Group. The players' reactions to these two
innovations are interesting:
a. Separate Move Periods-Out of 14 participants who commented,
12 called the separate move periods constructive, Only one said it
diminished the sense of reality; another for this reason cautioned
against its use in teaching and training-type exercises.
The participants were evenly divided between two schools: those
who felt that the research results could be improved, without loss of
any other values, by even greater formalization, concentration on strategic
planning, and stipulation of reactions by the teams rather than acting
them out; and those who felt that further formalization and streamlining
might destroy the atmosphere and end the "chain reaction" by which
the game becomes so to speak self-sustaining. It would almost seem
that Polex II came close to the limit of formalization without excessive
loss of the essential atmospherics. Perhaps there could be a further
condensation of written moves; some consolidation might be effected
through one participant's suggestion that the Control Group issue
a"world newspaper overnight. Perhaps the greatest loss from over-
streamlining would be. the elimination of important misunderstandings
between teams, which was one of the most intriguing results of Polex II.
Offsetting the decrease in realism is of course the opportunity
afforded by the new technique for more deliberate thinking. The payoff
should be in the quality of strategic planning in the game, including
that done by the Control Group. This element is discussed later.
b. Military Component -There is no doubt that the introduction
of qualified military personnel into the teams and Control Group of
Polex II supplied an element of flexibility lacking in Polex I. The
planners' concern that military personnel would be unable or unwilling
to make rapid judgments on a paper situation with the inadequate data
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available was not borne out. On the contrary, the game's designers
were pleasantly surprised by the ease with which military judgments
could be secured, and by the absence of difficulties based on technical
details. One umpire in retrospect judged the military feature to be
the critical element in the success of this exercise, and the other
umpire, agreeing, attributed this to the fact that the control team,
rather than simply supplying facts from which the teams could draw
conclusions, furnished information on the balance of military forces
and even predicted comparative outcomes, using its own military
capability tonmake its appreciations technically credible. Had the
exercise continued, it would have been possible to game out the
hostilities with which the play ended, but in that case it might have
been desirable to expand the available military views, even to the
extent of including a small military team whose sole function would
be to assess military factors and predict military outcomes.
Some other points of interest arising from the game are as follows:
c. The teams. There was virtually unanimous agreement among
the players that the size of the teams was close to ideal - 5 players,
plus a military adviser and a rapporteur. Suggestions were made for
experimenting with three playersand for supplying each team with an
intelligence expert specializing on the other side. The latter suggestion
seems promising. It was interesting that one team quickly developed
a rather explicit internal division of labor, whereas the other team
remained fairly undifferentiated. But there does not seem to be any
particular virtue in assigning specific roles within each team where
the focus is on outcomes of competing strategies rather than on the
processes of decision-making, as would be the case in a teaching or
training exercise.
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d. Time The question of duration and better utilization of
available time are commented on below. An additional issue has to do
with expanding or contracting real time within the game. Several
participants felt the jump of "thirty days" between moves three and
four to have been beneficial, but others said it excessively diminished
the sense of reality (and in any event should have been accompanied
by a new situation paper). In this view, it would have been preferable
to game only the events of a continuous three-day period. Another
point of view, however, was that the particular crisis needed far more
than the 30 days allowed and that the compression of events into that
period resulted in oversimplification.
On balance, it seems preferable to play through the crisis on a
continuous basis without telescoping time. But if the research purpose
is better served by refocusing the teams on a different situation -
as it seemed to be in Polex II - there is no intrinsic reason not to.
Indeed, there should be no objection even to stopping the game and
replaying a given move, using different strategy, if this will best
illuminate the problem under study.
2. Difficulties
The principal difficulties of the kind of exercise represented here
are four:
a. Perhaps the most significant difficulty lay in the failure of
the teams to work out an adequately detailed strategic plan at the
beginning of the game. Some earlier exercises required the players to
develop comprehensive strategic planning papers prior to the opening
of the exercise. The time of the players of both Polex I and II could
not be so trespassed upon. Yet at the same time the technique of Polex II
depended for its success on the degree to which the teams could analyse
and formulate strategies in a disciplined and structured way. This was
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particularly true given the absence of direct contact permitted between
teams. The game planners had hoped that the umpires in Polex II could
replace the direct interaction of Polex I by selecting from among
the contingency plans on both sides in order to mesh the teams' moves,
on the assumption that consecutive interact~on, while interesting and
stimulating, wouad not provide the desired richness of analysis.
It is likely that the game management did not insist sufficiently on
detailed contingency planning by the teams in the interval after the
initial briefing and the making of first moves. In future games employing
the separate move period technique, the entire first move period should
be dedicated to the formulation of strategic plans.
Throughout the subsequent move periods the teams did not prepare
revised contingency plans with any regularity until at the last stage
in the game, when the umpires specifically requested it. If at each
stage of the exercise such plans had been developed, the Control Group
would have had far less flexibility to revise the ground rules and
ultimately push the parties into a brink of war situation as was done
between Moves III and IV. A useful related suggestion is that a period
be set aside at the end of the exercise to enable the teams to make
an orderly evaluation of the underlying issues, a final appreciation
of the other side's capabilities and intentions, and an estimate of the
probable outcomes. It was felt that this would expose the findings of
the exercise even more effectively than the more formal critique sessions.
In this general connection, one participant noted a "touch of
disappointment on learning that the umpires- had no preconceived outcome
in mind. It is true that the umpires did not start with a detailed
strategic plan or even a firm hypothesis about the course events should
take. They did, however, have a distinct predilection for a sufficiently
intense situation to warrant serious consideration of military involvement,
a course of action they were finally able to evoke in the UN.a stage.
It would of course be possible for the umpires to have a detailed
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preconception of the outcome, complete with a program for each move
period. But such pre-planning could subject the game to the same dis-
abilities which are inherent in conventional planning and which the
game is designed to attempt to overcome, namely, the pressures typical
of a seminar or group discussion which tend to rule out any but the
accepted intellectual framework and interpretation of events. A more
spontaneously unfolding game illuminates the variety of intellectual
preconception and the wide range of alternative interpretations of
events and strategies. It might be possible to make available to the
umpires a tentative 'brevision" of the possible outcomes of the exercise
for the purpose of assisting them to employ the time most efficiently.
But one should avoid at all costs any attempt to substitute the strategic
preconceptions of the game planners for the creative and spontaneous
process which is in fact at the heart of the game technique.
b. The organization of the Control Group in Polex II was not
entirely successful and could be improved upon. The basic difficulty,
in retrospect, was that the functions of umpires and consultants were
combined to the occasional point of being indistinguishable. The line
was not initially drawn as sharply as it might have been, on the assumption
that the consultants could take full part in Control Group discussions
leading to decisions, without the decision-making process becoming
unmanageably collective. At times, because of defective planning of
both functional assignments and physical arrangements, instead of two
individuals umpiring, the game a group of 10 or so collectively acted
out the role of umpire under two co-chairmen (three if the Game Director
be counted).' It is probable that the 'physical arrangements rather than
ambiguity of role created the difficulty. What happened was an inevitable
consequence of excessive propirguity, with the umpires, consultants,
two technical assistants, and the Game Director all sitting around the
same conference table throughout virtually the entire game.
In the future the umpires, perhaps with the Game Director, should
be physically separated from the consultants. The umpires would then call
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upon the consultants on an ad hoc basis but would be free to act by
themselves when necessary. The major drawback in such a scheme is
the one which influenced the arrangements decided on in Polex II -
isolation and insufficient activity by the conoultants if physically
separated from the umpires.
One refinement which might go some distance in resolving that
problem grows out of the second major suggestion for improving on the
Polex II experience. The game was plagued by inadequate information
regarding third parties other than the two playing teams. The roles
of other countries were deliberately minimized to maximize concentration
on the bilateral game, but this experiment in fact went too far. There
should have been considerably more information both about other great
powers and about countries in the region under study.
One suggestion was made to set up a third playing team which would
either represent the target country or, alternatively, cover the most
implicated neighboring countries. For an exercise of the modest dimensions
of Polex II,particularly where no great additional quantity of team-
generated "noise" is wanted, the answer might well be to set up a third
consultative team consisting of consultants to the umpires who perform
the multiple function of a) supplying special expertise on the target
country, military problems, etc., and, b) through some rough division
of labor, also ensure that the essential actions and reactions of a11
other countries are brought to the umpires' attention. This scheme
could accomodate the suggestion that the intelligence role in the exercise
be upgraded in order to furnish the teams more systematically with infor-
mation of both intelligence and press variety. One of the control team can be
7esponsibl )1oi supplying both "classified" and "unclassified" intelligence.
On other details of operation, the assignment of consultants to
observe the two teams in a rotating basis was most useful in keeping
Control abreast of developments. There seemed to be great satisfaction
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with the role of military advisor in the control team. A like number
of participants was extravagant in praise of the umpires. The creation
of the role of Game Historian was unqualifiedly successful; in a
rearranged control team he should remain at the side of the umpires
to preserve the necessary vantage point.
c. The management of Polex II did not work the players hard enough.
They were on duty from 9 AM on Wednesday through the dinner hour, again
Thursday from 9 AM through the dinner hour, and on Friday from 9 until
before dinner. In retrospect, evening sessions should have been scheduled
on all three days, or at least on days one and two. This could have
had a number of beneficial effects. For one thing, it took about two
moves for the teams to actively respond to an ingredient cranked in
by the umpires. Instead of four move periods there could have been
six or even seven. Indeed, the crisis which the umpires created between
Moves III and IV might well have developed spontaneously over a longer
period of time; as one umpire put it, this move, was accelerated rather
than invented.
From Polex I we had concluded that five days would be the optimum
length, but -participants in Polex II felt strongly that this would be
excessive and for that reason probably impractical. There seemed to
be almost unanimous agreement that three days plus a partial day for
evaluation represents the outside limit for participation by the desired
caliber of players. This reality underscores the desirability of more
sessions in the three-day period. There was also some waste motion
due to the fact that teams were essentially at liberty between their
move periods, i.e., during the umpire move periods. It would probably
be desirable for the teams to hold informal sessions on basic strategy
during their interim periods, thus enhancing their over-all ability
to focus on basic strategic choices. This in fact is what the Control
Group did at Polex II.
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d. The process of critiquing the game could be further improved.
Polex II improved upon Polex I by having a night elapse between the
close of the game and the opening of the post-mortem session. The
post-mortem session at the second game was also planned in a more
deliberate and orderly fashion. Unquestionably it remains one of the
most valuable and illuminating aspects of gaming, particularly if it
exposes with lucidity the crucial strategic alternatives, turning points,
motivations and, above all, differences in the ways in which teams under-
stand each other and the issues. But the session itself is still not
entirely satisfactory for achieving this purpose. One reason may well
be that it is in competition with a different but perhaps equally needful
purpose - the therapetic one of collective catharsis after a sometimes
traumatic experience of group dynamics
Two suggestion in which many of the participants of Polex II
joined were: a) that the critique be longer than the three hours
allotted; and b) that the group session be preceded by an internal
"debriefing" session within each team, utilizing the "classified"
communications which they had theretofore missed. This last suggestion
seems particularly apt, even though it, like the suggestion that the
first game period be devoted to preparation of a strategic plan,
underscores the need for fuller utilization of the 3 or 4 day period.
(A further question about it is that such preliminary sessions could
result in prematurely washing away the points of friction within the
teams.) If it were done, the chief issues within each team as well as
the principal questions about the other team and about the game itself
could be discussed and given shape before the plenary briefing. After
reading the materials they had missedfthe teams would seek to reach
agreement about the main elements of their own strategy as well as about
the pressing questions about their opponent's strategy or about the
control moves which they wish to have illuminated. In the general session,
according to one suggestion, spokesmen for the two teams could present
those issues to the whole group as reflecting a consensus of their team.
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But while the theraputic value of talking out the problem would
have been in part accomplished through the individual team critique
session, perhaps a better suggestion would be to have individual team
members comment following the presentation by the team spokesmen, as
was done in Polex II, but with the difference that the team comments
would be more structured. Possibly all members of the teams could share
responsibility for the team presentation.
One final suggestion was that to improve the game's research results,
the critique should be considerably longer and built around joint team
committees, each of which would concentrate on a particular group of
issues and thei-r implications for American policy. After attempting
to do this somewhat singlehandedly in a substantive critique of the game,
the writer finds this a provocative suggestion. But rather than substitute
it for the critique session, which has its own values, the answer might
be to assign more than one person to follow up the game for these purposes.
3. Conclusions
The writer is considerably more optimistic about the serious professional
use of this technique for research and policy planning than before Polex II.
It is still too early to formulate a general theory or a system of
theoretical models for political gaming. In this connection, the
relevance of pure game theory here is only partial and can even be misleading.
The experimental evidence from political simulation is essentially
empirical and its variables infinite. Judgments about the evidence are
pragmatic, based on the quality of policy insights and conclusions which
the game stimulated. (The statements of the participants about this
particular value are interesting enough to be attached hereto as appendix 1.)
Moreover, it is still too early to assign precise values to various
substantive applications in the realm of research and planning.
But some general inferences can be stated. Political gaming seems
to have three promising applications in this area: as a test of hypotheses
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arrived at by more conventional methods; as a way of generating
new hypotheses which may then be studied, both conventionally and
by additional gaming; and, more controversially, as a fertile way
of adding to the catalogue of contingencies for a given conflict
situation in the realm of foreign policy,
A potentially new perspective on the political exercise was suggested
to the writer by the results of Polex II. It is that the game might
be useful as a model for a more general type of international situation
rather than as a. source of directives for one particular situation.
The substantive findings on Polex II are not uninteresting with regard
to the individual country under study, particularly as events unfold
in the area which are reminiscent of both the problem and its development
in the game. But the results seem equally relevant with regard to a whole
category of underdeveloped countries. The game raised vividly such generic
questions as: the kind of popular basis of support for pro-Western
regimes in one kind of foreign society; the kinds of strategies available
to the Soviet Union to embarrass the United States into making policy and
even troop commitments which may ultimately undermine the US political
and propaganda position; and the relative applicability of short-term
military support and longer-term developmental assistance in periods of
acute strain. In this sense - and perhaps only in this sense - the game
may be viewed as of general predictive value, even though for the particular
country in question it represents merely one of many possibilities.
The participants. in Polex II urged that similar exercises be under-
taken in the future, with emphasis on specific anticipated conflict
situations. Some suggested conducting two games simultaneously with one
control team, or repeating the same game to incorporate the experience
of the first go-round. Perhaps the most thoughtful suggestion was the
use of prior research for the purpose of disposing of as many issues
as possible, then gaming the "irreducible" issues. Certainly this suggestion
is worth merit, along with our present plan of having another comparable
academic research organization repeat the Polex II game, with the results
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to be compared, preferably alongside a round table planning exercise
of the same problem as a control.
On balance, additional support might well be secured for the purpose
of investigating this particular range of gaming techniques in a more
systematic way, with a view to advancing both its utility for research
and planning purposes and our understanding of its value as a tool
for those disciplines.
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Appendix 1.
Value for Research or Planning - Comments by participants
tRather optimistic", though acquiring sufficient evidence presents
obvious problems,
"Brings policy dilemmas and tacitc assumptions into the open. Implications
depend on subsequent evaluation.
Not an alternative to conventional analysis, but stimulates thinking
and may provide concrete clues or suggestions.
Quite valuable for substantive research.
Considerable value for research; analysis of results should bring out
strong and weak points of alternatives in strategic policy.
"An extremely efficient way of organizing the efforts of a group of
capable people to work on a problem or a group of problems. Problem
is transferring to a non-participant insights gained.
"(It) suggested areas where research might usefully be concentrated.
i.e. tribal allegi4ances, logistical and tactical features of the area,
etc.
"Outstanding value for policy planning. Undoubtedly every one of us
is now able to see certain contingencies more clearly than before.
Game points up need for greater appreciation of military factor and
certain limits of ethical action, in deterring indirect aggression. Excellent
tool for research and planning.
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Demonstrates how long teams can play strategies not well understood
by enemy. "The interaction of strategies not mutually understood, which
is clearly critical in the real world, can't be easily simulated by
any other technique.
"Excellent device for compelling serious consideration of basic interests
and objectives." Not a substitute for research but verifies results.
More useful for planning in uniquely turning up alternatives, possible
responses, etc.
"Very high", for both, chiefly as an "experiment in social psychology
pertinent to the study of planning, communications, intelligence inter-
pretation, decision-making" etc. Also efficiently acquaints player with
area problem.
Succeeded in turning up some terribly important questions. Would be of
more value if attached to ongoing research project on same problem.
"Great value for the study of social and political problems" because
introduces all elementsof problem. Regarding policy planning, "of definite
value" but "requiring great caution".
